Perimeter Security in Historical Context

Kim Cameron agrees with my comments on Perimeter Security that I write about here. It’s always reassuring when Kim agrees with you.

While I am beating on Perimeter Security like a rented mule, I thought it would be useful to share the best graphic I have ever come across depicting a typical Perimeter Security architecture:

Source

From the same Wiki page is a great summary, especially the last sentence:

Generally considered one of the great failures of military history, the term "Maginot Line" is now sometimes used as a metaphor for something that is confidently relied upon though ending up being ineffective. It could be argued that this association is inaccurate, as the Line achieved the specific task it was intended to do, rendering a direct assault against France's eastern border impossible (the few Maginot forts which were directly attacked by German armored troops held very well). It would be more truthful to state that the Line was sound, but France's strategic use of it was poor. As originally envisaged, the Maginot Line was only part of a larger defense plan, in which the Line was to provide coordinated backup to resistance from the French Army. But execution of the plan was lax and this, combined with a failure to appreciate that the frustration of one particular approach would not necessarily render an aggressor impotent, cost both the Line and the French Army their effectiveness. In some sense, French authorities came to believe their own propaganda: that the mere existence of the Line rendered them impervious to invasion.

[Emphasis added]

I think this is very appropriate to a Perimeter Security discussion. The point is not that Perimeter Security is not valuable; the point is that it isn’t sufficient. You must assume that your perimeter will be breached and plan according.  Your perimeter is there to make that breach more difficult.

Let me close with these four words:

Rogue Wireless Access Points